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Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts Panel
Transcript: Who's Left Holding the [Brand Name] Bag?
Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet
Proposed Secondary Liability Regimes for Trademark Infringement Online:
Commentary
JANE GINSBURG: This is our last panel, and the object is to bring a number
of experts, including practitioners and academics, from the United States and from
abroad, to react to the two proposals that we just heard. Each of the panelists will
give initial comments, and then we are going to go around the table again so that
our panelists can react to one another's comments. We will go in the following
order:
First, Amy Cotton from the Patent and Trademark Office. She's our
government representative. I'm not sure if you're speaking with your government
hat or disclaiming-
AMY COTTON: Disclaiming.
JANE GINSBURG: Disclaiming-but she's still from the government.
Next, Bob Weigel, at the far end, who is with Gibson Dunn and represented
Gucci in the Gucci v. Frontline case.' Bob will be speaking, I suspect, from the
brand owner point of view.
BOB WEIGEL: That's a fair bet.
JANE GINSBURG: Next, Bruce Rich from Weil Gotshal, who happens to
have been the successful counsel in the eBay case. 2 I think you'll be standing in for
the service providers.
And then, crossing a couple of oceans-one ocean first: Miquel Peguera, from
the Open University of Catalonia, who is a leading expert on the liability or non-
liability of service providers. He has, among other things, published an important
article in the Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts,3 which will be publishing the
proceedings of this symposium a couple of months hence.
And then, from across yet another ocean-Irene Calboli, who is currently
visiting at the National University of Singapore and who will be talking about the
effect of the free trade agreements and the potential trans-Pacific partnership on
questions of secondary liability for service providers.
AMY COTTON: Thank you, Jane. I'm wearing my invisible government hat,
so watch out.
1. Gucci Arn., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
3. Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European Counterparts: A
Comparative Analysis ofSome Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2009).
621
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
Graeme raised an interesting point about process. What's the process that we're
using to get to the substantive rule? And I think that pretty much summarizes
where I'm coming from-my paradigm when I'm looking at policy regulation. I
proceed with lots of caution as to regulatory action. For instance, my default
position on the Lanham Act is don't amend it. So when I hear calls for, "Oh, we
need a statutory change! We need to implement a statute," I start twitching a little
bit.
Certainly, in doing my due diligence to see if such a change would be useful,
necessary and reasonable, I look at other models. The DMCA [Digital Millennium
Copyright Act] is certainly the first thing that we're going to look at.4 Talking to
my copyright colleagues, and learning about some of the issues with the DMCA
and safe harbors, gives me pause in terms of proceeding down that path. And then,
of course, we butt right up against the SOPA [Stop Online Piracy Act]/PIPA
[PROTECT IP Act] conflagration and concerns that the atmosphere is pretty toxic
right now on Capitol Hill for anything that smacks of net censorship.' At this
point, I look for other options for addressing these needs. For the past thirteen
years, I have worked a lot on the ICANN [Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers] portfolio,6 looking at that bottom-up, consensus-based
market organization.
The U.S. government has put a lot of time and effort into trying to make sure
that we have all of the players at the table and that all of the players are discussing,
on equal footing, what the administration of the domain name system should look
like. As you know, the domain name system is quite a choke point for regulating
behavior in these various top-level domains. So, over thirteen years, I've looked at
a couple of expansions of the domain name system. This most recent one, with
1943 applications for new top-level domains, is a bit overwhelming, but it presents
an amazing opportunity for market innovation.7  And I keep reminding the
trademark owners who came screaming to the USPTO and the U.S. government,
saying, "I'm going to have to police 1900 TLDs [top-level domains]! What are you
doing? How can you agree to this?" I say, "Well, it was always contemplated that
the domain name system was going to expand."
But look at it this way: with a lot of these new TLDs, there are opportunities for
trusted spaces for retailers, for brand owners and for consumers. I think these dot
brands, in particular, are a really interesting idea: that you've got places where, for
example, Abbott Pharmaceuticals can market legitimate, true Abbott
Pharmaceutical products to their whole distribution chain, and they control the heck
out of it to make sure consumers get what they want. I think that's a really
4. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.).
5. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); PROTECT IP Act, S. 968, 112th
Cong. (2011).
6. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. See INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
7. See Karen E. Klein, The Latest Domain-Name Gold Rush, BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-04/the-latest-domain-name-gold-rush.
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interesting idea.
I know there are different ideas in the room about this, but some of the closed
generics-dot book run by Google or Amazon, or dot generic term run by one
particular company, are closed, so the company would control the terms of use and
control who got in. I thought that was very interesting to watch-perhaps
anticompetitive, but very interesting to watch-to see what they would do to make
it valuable to the consumer. How are you going to pull people out of the
unregulated Wild West of dot-corn and into these trusted spaces, so that we can be
sure as consumers that we are getting what we want, and so that the retailers can
make sure that they are not being flooded by illegitimate products? It is very much
an innovative idea that could happen, but it could also very well get tanked. The
expansion of the domain name system could get overregulated.
We've been working for a long time to make sure that there was a balance, that
intellectual property owners and the registrars and all these entities were talking to
come to some sort of consensus about what was reasonable, what the market could
bear, so that these TLDs would actually succeed.
So, I start from that space of avoiding overregulation in order to promote
innovation. I'm certainly looking at the idea of the voluntary agreements. You
heard about the EU MOU this morning.8 We have about four or five voluntary
agreements percolating in the United States. We are watching those very carefully
to see who is coming to the table and what they are negotiating. We're not at the
table; we're just watching what's going on at the table, because there is concern.
We heard about anticompetitive concerns with regard to big platforms coming to
the table and not the little guys.
But I think that the industry setting the standards for what is reasonable, what is
sustainable and what is a good business model, is really important. And it will
probably end up being a safe harbor in many respects as the case law in the United
States evolves. So, those who are coming to the table are sort of setting what the
standard of care should be, what the duty of care should be. I think it's a very
interesting development to watch.
JANE GINSBURG: Thank you.
BOB WEIGEL: The way I come at this is that the whole reason for this
conference is that the people who are actually doing the counterfeiting are crooks,
not to put too fine a point on it. There are plenty of laws to prohibit them from
doing what they're doing. The problem is that it is hard to get at them and to hold
them accountable. And so, we're having an entire conference about how to hold
someone else liable for what they're doing, which is intentional and wrong. And I
think that's important to recognize, because in these instances, they have factories.
They're churning out handbags or jewelry or sneakers or jeans every day. They
pop off the line, and they have to sell them. So it is a constant game of cat and
mouse as to what the brand owners can do. The brand owners are also trying to run
8. European Commission, Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via
the Internet (May 4, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/iprenforcement/docs/memorandum_04052011_en.pdf.
2014] 623
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
a business at the same time that these folks, every day, are going home and saying,
"How can I get around what the brand owners are doing?"
If you think about it, a company with the resources of Microsoft, and the talent,
and the software and so forth-they shut down nineteen million Web sites in a
year, and they didn't get them all. As Tom said, all they're trying to do is push
these guys back to page ten or eleven or twelve on the Google search, so that you
can't find them.
I do worry, if you try to impose liability on the ISPs-and with statutory
damages, it could be a big number-how are you going to get an ISP to do better
than Microsoft? Because there's always going to be somebody out there selling
stuff. Clearly, if the ISP has notice and they keep doing it, they should be liable.
But I do think there's some flexibility as to where the "should have known about it"
lies, because I think that, as the technology keeps getting better and better, there
may be ways for an ISP to determine, either electronically or at low cost, that a
Web site is selling fake stuff. People are coming out with new techniques all the
time to try to tell the electronic signature of a Web site-they've left some sort of
fingerprint here, and we can scale that across the Web and find other places where
they've left that signature. And that may become feasible over time.
But I'm also going to take a somewhat radical position and say that it doesn't
matter. Because if you stop all the responsible ISPs, the folks who have assets, the
folks who you could go against, from hosting these Web sites, then all you're going
to end up doing is pushing the Web sites to ISPs in locations that are difficult to
police and difficult to enforce. I've gotten injunctions against counterfeiters, and
presented it to an ISP-in that case, it was China-and they basically told me to
pound sand. There were other ways we were able to shut down the Web site, but
there are alternatives for counterfeiters besides the traditional Web sites-besides
GoDaddy and so forth. And it would be good to stop GoDaddy from allowing
people to register fake domain names, but it's not going to solve the problem. It's
just going to push the problem to a different place.
When you look at these Web sites that are selling fake products, it's fog-
there's nothing that's true on that Web site. The pictures are not pictures of what
you're going to get when you order it. The pictures are pictures of, probably, the
legitimate goods. The addresses and the names of the people who registered, even
if you get behind the privacy providers, are going to be fake, or it's going to be a
name in some place where it's going to be hard to chase them.
The problem really is, to my mind, that the only things that are real are the email
address that you buy the goods with and the way that they process the money that
you send to them. And that, I think, is ultimately their weakness. We've been able
to establish in certain instances that when somebody has an economic interest,
when they're dealing with a Web site holder as a business proposition-for
example, the bank that processes the credit cards-it is, in effect, in a credit
relationship with that Web site. And because they are, in effect, lending money to
that Web site every time that they process a sale and give them the money from the
sale, they know what that business is. And those banks are legitimate, and those
banks have assets, and if you can hold those banks accountable, then you can make
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it that much more difficult, because somehow the goods have to come across the
ocean and the money has to go the other way. And the only way you can really do
that is sue the banking system.
BRUCE RICH: I've had the good fortune of thinking about these important
and difficult issues in the crucible of what's become-little did we know at the
time-a major bellwether of secondary liability. We represented eBay in the
Tiffany v. eBay case. 9 And what I came away with from this experience is that the
real world is dirty and messy, that this isn't a binary, clean situation, and that what
appears to work best-and the question is, what are the mechanisms to make it
work-is really a cooperative endeavor.
What you want in a workable trademark system is obviously ample and even
robust protection for the rights of trademark owners, but also, in the setting of
Internet commerce, to encourage innovation, to exalt this amazing new technology
that benefits so many in so many ways, and also to encourage good faith
enforcement activities and efforts by, among others, online intermediaries like
eBay.
The experience we had, at least with eBay and its efforts, is-number one-that
you need the cooperative effort for the system to work. You need the combination
of continuing the primary policing role of the trademark owner, for all the reasons
that are obvious. The trademark owner has the primary economic incentive and
investment in its product and in the goodwill behind the trademarks. It has unique
knowledge as to which of its goods are legitimate and which aren't. And the record
in eBay was just filled with testimony from gemologists at Tiffany and quality
assurance folks who said, "Oh my God! I've got to pull out my calipers and study
this stuff in the lab." We all know that there's no way that eBay could look at a
picture and figure out what's legitimate or not. That's just the reality. That's the
dirty, real world reality that we face here: try as it might, eBay couldn't possibly
replicate what the trademark owner can in terms of separating the wheat from the
chaff, in terms of what's legitimate and what's counterfeit.
But at the same time, it does behoove the intermediary to provide ready,
accessible tools, a workable means to facilitate the notice-and-take-down system.
In our record, we had something like a quarter of a million notices, and the record
showed that in each and every case, without dispute from Tiffany, within twenty-
four hours-and by trial, typically within four hours-eBay took this stuff down.
Now does that mean other stuff slipped through? Absolutely yes. Is there a perfect
system? Absolutely not.
But the second opening comment I want to make is that I do believe that the
current legal regime and the current rule evolving out of Inwood is sufficiently
flexible and adaptable over time to make it work.10 I don't think it encourages
9. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
10. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) ("Even if a manufacturer
does not directly control others in the chain of distribution, it can be held responsible for their infringing
activities under certain circumstances. If a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know
is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for
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minimal enforcement. It certainly doesn't encourage lying back and doing nothing
but the minimum in terms of waiting for that notice.
I think the combination of cases like Fonovisa," and 1-800 Contacts in the
Tenth Circuit12 and Louis Vuitton v. Akanocl3 all indicate that where a court senses
that the defendant was lying back, and had a reason to know, if not actual
knowledge, of infringing activity, there are ample means within the knowledge
branch and the reason-to-know branch. And in grafting the willful blindness
doctrine, [there are ways] for courts to separate out truly good faith efforts,
amplified by significant investments in the case of an entity like eBay, from
somebody who is just trying to slide under the radar, or worse, really trying to
shield and foment infringement. So while the system isn't perfect, it strikes me that
it works well.
Last preliminary comment: I think we ought to give the law time to keep
working through, to really keep developing those factual situations. If and when
there's a time to look at a statutory remedy, personally I'd prefer to see it down the
road a bit, after more applications of the knowledge take-down standard against the
real world facts we confront.
MIQUEL PEGUERA: Thank you very much. I'll try to be brief. I think the
word is "balance," as we heard this morning. I would like to discuss some
elements that may be relevant for achieving that balance.
On the one hand, I think that the nature of the underlying infringement must be
taken into account. The mere use of an identical or similar mark doesn't
necessarily raise a red flag of infringement. And of course, the search for a better
balance in secondary liability for trademark infringement should not be a means to
expand trademark rights, giving trademark owners exclusive control of the
trademarked words-for instance, trying to prevent legitimate commerce or
legitimate uses of them.
On the other hand, I think the current common law standards in the U.S. should
be clarified in order to achieve more legal certainty. Legal certainty must be a goal.
However, we must also take into account that a high level of certainty may actually
impair the balance sought. In fact, open rules, with some inevitable degree of
uncertainty, are necessary if all interests at stake are to be taken into consideration,
while by contrast, clear-cut rules tend to be one-sided, as is the case, for instance,
with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.14 It works very well, but at
the expense of giving service providers absolute immunity and completely
disregarding the interests of the aggrieved parties.
In order to achieve a better balance, should we place a special duty of care on
Internet intermediaries? Some duty of care is already established under the current
law, as intermediaries are at least expected to react to notices of specific
any harm done as a result of the deceit.").
11. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1995).
12. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013).
13. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
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infringements. This standard might evolve to require the adoption of some
reasonable measures, but I don't think that the service providers should bear the
duty of monitoring or actively seeking infringement. This is not the current law in
trademark, or in copyright, and I don't think this should be radically changed.
Thus, the burden of policing should remain mainly on rights holders-though, of
course, voluntary agreements by platforms to take preventive measures are
certainly desirable.
That said, I think that bad actors-meaning those who clearly and purposely
induce infringement or are willfully blind to rampant infringement-should not
escape liability. Of course, willful blindness under current law is somewhat
ambiguous, particularly regarding the question of whether or not it must refer to
specific instances of infringement. I think that to find liability, willful blindness
must be clear enough, but not necessarily constricted to specific instances of
infringement.
Regarding particular types of intermediaries, such as credit card processing
services and other financial intermediaries, I share the concerns expressed by the
Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 v. Visa, on the perils of expanding secondary liability to
include such companies.15 However, in light of facts that clearly indicate bad faith,
such as in the Gucci case, I think that liability could attach.16 Regarding the level
of control needed to find contributory liability, I think that the Ninth Circuit's
standard in Lockheed Martin sets the threshold too high when it requires direct
control and monitoring of the instrumentality used to infringe the mark." This
standard should be better defined, and it should be clarified whether it requires
actual control or just the ability to control.
I would also like to say something about the European situation, which I don't
find to be satisfactory either, but maybe that could be in the following round.
IRENE CALBOLI: In this first round, I will focus my comments on two
primary points. First, I would like to briefly react to some of the remarks that have
been made today by panelists and commentators. Second, I would like to briefly
mention the issues and, primarily, the challenges that have to be considered when
discussing the international harmonization of laws in this area. In the second
round, I will focus specifically on some of the challenges that I have witnessed
firsthand while researching in this area with respect to the current status of the law
in South East Asian jurisdictions.
If I can gather a general theme from today's many excellent contributions, it is
that various parties across a large spectrum of constituencies-academics, legal
practitioners and likely even the government-seem to generally agree that it is
really the trademark owners who ultimately should carry the weight of policing the
use of their marks in contexts of secondary liability. In other words, trademark
owners are those "left holding the bag." This is not necessarily an unhappy ending
for trademark owners, however. Instead, I would argue that this is an opportunity
15. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
16. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
17. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
2014] 627
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
for trademark owners, so that they can directly decide how to implement the
monitoring protocols that they believe are best for their respective and varying
business models. In other words, by setting ad hoc programs based upon their
individual business needs, trademark owners can identify the types of infringement
that they really care about. Not all infringements and infringers are equal, as we
know; some are worse than others and nobody else can identify the "red alert"
infringements better than trademark owners. To date, judicial decisions, in the
United States in particular and perhaps also in Europe, seem to have fully embraced
this approach, which I believe remains the best approach. 18 At one point, certain
trademark owners were more interested in pushing for more liability for Internet
service providers (ISPs), but did not succeed in their plea, as added liability for
ISPs remains a very controversial issue. Of course, the heated debates in this area
hide, at least in part, one of the main, yet not explicitly discussed, points of
contention: namely the costs of "holding the bag." For trademark owners,
intermediaries and the courts, costs (the cost of policing in particular) are not a
negligent aspect of this debate. Still, at least in the United States, it seems that the
courts have created a fairly balanced system, in which "bad guys" are usually
stopped while legitimate business can continue in the marketplace. Moreover,
today we have learned that the activity of policing can be outsourced to specialized
entities, and that the costs of policing the Web are not as prohibitive as we may
have thought. Accordingly, in spite of trademark owners' concerns, trademark
owners can provide for those extra costs of monitoring, and in turn be able to have
better and targeted information about the type and the extent of infringement that
they want to stop. In light of these observations, not increasing the duty of care
would thus be the best model for the future.
Still, from what Stacey Dogan again reminded us this morning, the debate about
secondary liability remains in many ways a debate that reflects an underlying
struggle between concepts such as morality and fairness in competition, but also
about the efficiency of the overall market (and judicial) system. In other words, as
the courts seem to indicate, it is a debate about stopping the "bad guys" but
allowing (substantially) legitimate fair users and intermediaries to continue to do
business, because they are useful for consumers, businesses and innovation.19
Imagine a world without eBay, Google and Amazon, for example. I would not like
to live in that world myself. Here is where I think that the American, and in
general the common law, model has been able to find ways to strike a balance.
This is a positive even if the balance relies on a very wide spectrum of standards to
find secondary trademark infringement, spanning all the way from specific and
actual knowledge to general and constructive knowledge, and even willful
blindness to almost a negligence standard. Still, the real standard in most of these
cases, at least in my opinion, remains a "we see the bad guys, and we know when
we see it" standard.20 The judiciary seems to carefully look at this standard first,
18. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
19. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
20. See, e.g., id.
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and later elaborates on the type of knowledge and control. that is required in the
case at issue for a finding of secondary trademark liability. Stacey Dogan has
argued this point in the past, and I defer to her work for a detailed explanation. 21
Ultimately, she argued, and I agree, that we are seeing a Sony-type of approach
followed by the courts in many of these cases in the United States, and this is a
positive development.
In light of these considerations, besides cultural differences, language barriers
and so forth, I think that one of the main problems in creating a system of
international harmonization in this area is one that is often at the center of many
comparative law debates-the fact that we are dealing with two different types of
legal systems: common law and civil law. We all know that the common law
system heavily relies on judicial precedents, and that these precedents are
authoritative. The civil law system considers judicial precedent, but does not rely
on it in the same way. This difference is particularly relevant in this area, as most
of the developments in secondary trademark liability standards have been
happening as the result of judicial decisions rather than because of the
implementation of new laws. This is an area in which the flexibility of the
common law has permitted the courts to navigate difficult cases and ultimately
adapt the law based on the facts of the specific circumstances at issue.
Accordingly, even if it is true that the common law relies more heavily on statutory
law than before, it remains a reality that, in most jurisdictions, statutory law does
not yet include ad hoc provisions for secondary trademark infringement. In an area
like the European Union, in which we have an integration of common law and civil
law countries, this difference is something that we need to consider carefully while
deciding how to create standards, particularly via legislative instruments. On the
one hand, these instruments need to include guiding criteria for the civil law courts
that cannot rely directly on the principle of stare decisis. On the other, these
criteria need to be flexible enough to permit the courts to continue ferretting out the
bad guys while allowing basically legitimate businesses to continue to serve
consumers, as common law courts have been able to do so far.
JANE GINSBURG: Thank you very much. Before we go into our second
round of reactions, I wanted to point out something that both Bob and Miquel
talked about, because it might have been sub rosa in the morning but it deserves
heightened attention now. In the morning, we mostly talked about the auction
platforms and the service providers placing ads-those were our principal
paradigms. Bob reminds us that there is another very important service provider,
and that's the payment provider. With respect to trademark infringement, perhaps
unlike copyright infringement, it really comes down to money. There are a lot of
people out there liberating the content of motion pictures and popular music with
non-monetary motives. But there's not a lot of file sharing of sneakers going on
out there. So it does come down, to a large extent, to money, and perhaps we
should focus a little more in this round of comments on how the standards for
21. See generally Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sonyfor Napster and
Other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGs L.J. 939 (2001).
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secondary liability can reach the payment providers. Miquel evoked the two
leading (and in some tension) decisions in the United States, Visa International and
Gucci. You can take different lessons from those two cases. I think we'll stay in
the order that we started, but I might ask that in addition to whatever comments you
were going to make, please address the payment provider issue.
AMY COTTON: One of the reasons that I am reticent to engage in the
statutory notice and takedown paradigm at this point is because it could very well
be overtaken by events with the development of technology. I'm trying to
understand the cloud-I don't know if you all are as well, but I'm having trouble
with that. There are a couple of issues coming out. What's the obligation of a
cloud service provider with regard to secondary liability? That remains to be seen.
This new idea of content curation: are rights holders going to be able to identify
the physical location of offending content that is retrieved by the curator? This
relates to mobile applications. If you have a mobile app that tells you what gas
stations are close by, there is no central takedown point. How is notice and
takedown going to help you if everything is floating in the cloud, and these new
mobile apps are pulling down from the cloud, with no central takedown point to get
at it anyway? It seems to me that it's going to end some reliance on [notice and
takedown procedures].
I think another point to think about-which in light of the domain name
expansion process seems a little scary-is are we moving away from URLs? Are
we moving away from search? Is scanning technology going to eliminate the need
for browsers and search engines, when you can just scan in the code that takes you
directly where you want to go? The idea of this new collective intelligence is can
rights holders retain control over the public image of their brand when the online
community increasingly wants to provide feedback about the brand? The brand is
going to pop up all over the place, and how are brand owners going to be able to
control that? With that on the horizon, and potentially the immediate horizon, it
seems a bit backwards-looking to legislate a notice and takedown statutory regime.
But certainly, I think that seems to be pretty well embedded in the system.
Certainly it could be regularized. The notices could be better regularized, and I
think the voluntary agreements in Europe are certainly informing that process in the
United States.
Since we are talking.about payment processors, there is a voluntary agreement
with payment processors. They're all trying to make it so that the terms of use for
that particular payment processor include a provision that says, "If you violate our
policies, we will terminate your account." So, with that in mind, it seems that the
trick is putting a lot of attention on these terms of use and enforcing them. What I
like about the payment processor voluntary agreement is that the International
AntiCounterfeiting Coalition stepped in to make it easier for both sides to
implement it. They aggregate complaints for a particular payment processor or
particular URL, and deliver those to the payment processors in a standardized form,
which sort of greases the skids for the whole process. This is another way that the
industry is stepping in to promote communication between the two sides, so that it
can be a more efficient process.
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ROBERT WEIGEL: You mentioned the Perfect 10 case. I think it was
probably my first day in law school, back in 1978, when somebody said: "Bad
facts make bad law." If you just hear the facts of the case-one pornographer sued
Visa because another pornographer had taken his pornography and was selling it on
the Internet and accepting Visa cards-you just know how that case is going to
come out.22 It came out the way it did in part because it really was not a trademark
case; it was a copyright case, and people could download it easily. The court held
that you didn't need to take money to infringe on this person's pornography. 23
Judge Kozinski dissented;24 I don't know what that means. But the Frontline case
that we argued was a hard goods case. It was pocketbooks. 25 As Jane said, nobody
is giving away pocketbooks. You need to get paid before the goods get shipped
over the ocean. Somehow, money needs to go back to where the goods are made.
Basically, a merchant contracts with a bank to process its credit card transactions,
and the merchant will then, at the end of the day, present its transactions to the
bank, and the bank will give the merchant ninety-five, ninety-six cents on the
dollar. The bank will then process it through Visa, and it will eventually end up on
your credit card statement. At the end of the day, the bank is actually lending
money to the merchant when it gives the merchant the money, the ninety-five cents
on the dollar, because if the transaction doesn't go through for whatever reason, or
gets reversed, or somebody complains that they got a fake instead of a real thing, or
it broke apart, the bank is on the hook to Visa to refund that money. And then the
bank has to go look for the merchant. We were able to use that process to say that
the bank is performing credit analysis on its merchants before it agrees to accept
them. By having that interaction, the bank knew what they it doing, and that's how
we convinced the court not to dismiss the case and to hold that the bank was liable.
In another case, one of the parties was an agent of the bank whose job was to go
out and sell credit card processing services to various merchants.26 It's a big
industry that probably not many of us know too much about, but people do go out
and say that they can get you credit card processing services. These folks were
advertising that they could do things that nobody else could do, or that they would
take on products that nobody else would take on. They would take on
pornography, they would take on herbal supplements, they would take on gambling
and they would take on replica Web sites. The judge found that we had stated a
claim, on the grounds that they were inducing people to commit trademark
violations.
At the end of the day, if you're shipping goods, the money has to go back, and
that really is the only thing that's real on any of these Web sites. The money has to
get to the person who makes the stuff, somehow. If you can get in the middle of
that-if you can hold the people liable who are actually interacting with the
22. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793.
23. Id. at 796-97.
24. Id. at 810 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
25. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 238 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
26. Id.
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merchant in some way and having a business relationship-you're not talking
about scanning Web sites, but instead targeting somebody who actually reaches out
and has some economic interest in knowing what this person does. If you can hold
them liable and disrupt the payments, I think you can actually make some progress
here.
I would just like to disagree a little bit with this concept that it is so hard to tell
whether a site is selling fake stuff. If you look at a Web site, and they're selling
fifteen different Tiffany jewelry products, and they're shipping it from China-and
they'll say, "We're shipping it via EMS," the Chinese postal service-that's a fake
Web site. I know that. I may not be able to go into court and say that just yet, but I
know it. Why can't we have a system that imposes some requirement on somebody
to shut that down until somebody comes and says, "Oh, by the way, my
grandmother gave me a really big pile of Tiffany's stuff and I'm trying to sell it"?
That will never happen. It's really a matter of who pays for the cost of looking at
these Web sites and shutting them down. In reality, everybody knows. There'll be
some exceptions around the edges, but certainly, I think there should be some sort
of reasonableness standard imposed on the people who interact with these Web
sites to say, "Come on, look at it, you know it's fake."
BRUCE RICH: The Tiffany case was brought-if anybody wants to dig back
to the annals of the complaint and the earliest filings-on the premise that sales of
lots offering five or more items of Tiffany jewelry were "invariably" counterfeit. 27
I remember standing up before Judge Buckwald, who was our judge originally, at
our first conference just to chat about the case. She immediately pushed back on
my able adversary by saying, "Wait a minute. I'm a Tiffany shopper. Are you
telling me that if I decide someday, as I get my affairs in order, that I want to clean
out some of my Tiffany goods and put them online, that I'm going to be in that
category of counterfeiter if it is a lot of five?" The problem is, and the record of
course demonstrated, that you could walk into the 57th Street Flagship Tiffany as
part of a bridal shower and say, "I want to buy five gifts for my bridesmaids here,"
and they will gladly sell it to you. The problem is that the assumptions of "almost
invariably" are wrong, and therefore finding that rule of reasonableness-let alone
across, in the case of an eBay, potentially millions of new listings per day-is
really an impossibility. And that is, again, dirtying our hands with the real-world
facts.
I want to add just a couple words on why I think the accretive approach to
development of the law makes sense here. We counsel a wide range of folks on
both sides of the equation, but also a lot of social media platforms, intermediaries
and content hosts. And I would say that, certainly dealing with the level of
sophistication we typically deal with (and I know that issue came up earlier, and
it's a challenging one), there is almost a uniform view that more is better, that not
cutting the close line is the right way to go. Nobody really wants to test the
implications of the back end of the Tifany Inc. v. eBay Inc. ruling: had eBay not
27. Complaint at 11, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 04
Civ. 4607).
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done all of these proactive things,28 nobody quite knows what the inference from
that is or should be. But I think no responsible person in this day and age wants to
test it. I think the general view is there is a harmony of interest: safe trading sites
and places where consumers are going to feel that they can trust the experience are
a good thing, but the more people can do proactively-as a business matter that is
also consonant with good legal practice-the better. And I think all of that, again,
is going to continue to shake out over time.
Finally, on Jane's question: I am colored by an experience of about four years
representing Bertelsmann in one of the post-Napster environment cases. 29 In that
case, Bertelsmann, on the theory that no good deed goes unpunished, lent $85
million to the old Napster to assist it in converting to a fully compliant subscription
service.30 It was met by a class action lawsuit, on behalf of all music publishers in
the United States, and each of the major record labels-then more than we have
today-also sued.31 Conservatively, the estimated damages were about $17 billion,
on the premise that the money, which it was alleged was used to propagate Napster
for eight months longer than it otherwise would have survived, at the rate of 10,000
estimated infringements per second-think about that-gave rise to this punishing
liability.32 So we gave a lot of thought to the issue of how far down the chain of
investors-liability concept, in that case, under copyright law-makes sense. And
I think, no differently than what we are debating and discussing today, there are
deep and important policy considerations about how far down the line you reach, at
least to good faith investors. And I think at least some of that resonated with me
when I read Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa.33 I think it is just a really difficult area. It is
somewhat facile, it seems to me, to say, "Well, they are the deep pockets. They can
shut it off. Let them do it." I think we have to think beyond the immediate to the
longer-term consequences for what fuels the economy.
MIQUEL PEGUERA: Yes, I agree with what Bruce was saying. We have to
think about the consequences, and there are clearly dangers in expanding liability to
these types of intermediaries. The mere fact that the payment processor is able to
stop the transaction or make it more difficult for those transactions to take place is
not enough to find liability.
On the other hand-I was reserving this final comment for the European
situation-as you know, in Europe, we have this horizontal safe harbor scheme, but
there are problems as well. Not only because of the different traditions in every
national law, but also because of the interpretation of the safe harbors by the
European Court of Justice. For instance, to benefit from the hosting safe harbor of
the E-Commerce Directive,34 the European Court of Justice has established a
28. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93,98-100 (2d Cir. 2010).
29. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
30. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
31. Id.
32. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000), af' d in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
33. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007).
34. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 (EC).
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prerequisite that the service provider has not played an active role of such a kind as
to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data stored.35
I think this prerequisite is too stringent and does not comport with the actual
language of the Directive. Actually, it was taken from a recital that does not
actually deal with the hosting safe harbor, but with mere conduit and caching.36 In
any event, I believe intermediaries should be given more freedom to take voluntary
preventive measures without the fear of falling outside of the safe harbors for not
being neutral enough. That threshold should be lowered to avoid this situation. On
the other hand, as we have seen this morning, when a defendant does not qualify
for the E-Commerce Directive safe harbors, there is no harmonized regime for its
potential secondary liability, as it depends on the national law of the member states
with very different material regimes. In addition, injunctive relief is crucial, and
nonetheless the E-Commerce Directive leaves it completely to national law, with
the only limit that the relief granted does not amount to a general, rather than
specific, monitoring obligation-a distinction that the Directive establishes in its
recital 47. And the meaning of that is not that clear. Some national courts have
established an obligation to keep infringing content from reappearing in the future,
though this may entail a sort of general monitoring obligation. I think that the
limitations on injunctive relief should be clarified, particularly the relationship
between Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive and Article 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive.38
Finally, as a general remark, I would say that communication and cooperation
between Internet platforms and rights holders is of the utmost importance, and
some type of notice and take action procedure should be put in place. The
Memorandum of Understanding on the sale of counterfeit goods via the Internet
was a step in the right direction. 39
IRENE CALBOLI: Following up on the remarks of the other panelists, I will
first add a short comment on the issue of financial intermediaries, and from there
I'm going to tie in the conversation about South East Asia. I agree that for
financial intermediaries like Visa, Mastercard and PayPal, the same standard for
secondary liability should apply that applies to other intermediaries. I think the
courts in the United States have applied these standards quite efficiently so far, and
35. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-236/08 - C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417, 1-2514 ("Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 must be interpreted as
meaning that the rule laid down therein applies to an internet referencing service provider in the case
where that service provider has not played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or
control over, the data stored.").
36. See id. at 1-2512 to 13 (pointing to recital 42 in the preamble to Directive 2000/31).
37. Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 6 (EC) ("Member States are prevented from
imposing a monitoring obligation on service providers only with respect to obligations of a general
nature; this does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect
orders by national authorities in accordance with national legislation.").
38. See Council Directive 2004/48, art. 11, 2000 O.J. (L 195) 16, 23 (EC); Council Directive
2000/31, art. 15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 (EC).
39. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 8.
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found financial intermediaries liable in several circumstances. 40 1 also think that
the possibility of finding financial intermediaries liable becomes even more crucial
when it is linked to the previous discussion of harmonization of treatment of
secondary liability across different jurisdictions. Sometimes, a Web site might be
created in South East Asia, for example, and might sell products that are either
explicitly counterfeit or that are made to look like genuine products. The Web
site's IP address and corresponding ISP may be located in a jurisdiction in which
the system of notice and take down does not work as well as it works in the United
States and Europe. Thus, in the short term, the possibility of sanctioning payment
service providers for this Web site in the United States may be the only means for
trademark owners to stop the infringing activity.
I speak from firsthand experience. I wanted to purchase a DVD that was not
available on Amazon, and I found it at the Web site www.pandadvd.com. The
DVD was available for $16.99 USD. Because I did not know the Web site, I
purchased the DVD via Paypal. Three weeks later, I received a "gift package"
from Thailand, which contained a DVD that was obviously a counterfeit product. I
had no idea that this DVD was counterfeit when I ordered it, but PayPal got its cut.
A few weeks later, the Web site was gone. Obviously, this type of infringing
activity is very difficult to stop just by "going after" the service provider or even
the importers of the counterfeit products-as we know, only a small percentage of
the contents of the shipments going through United States ports is actually
inspected. This is why the ability to "go after" the financial intermediaries could be
very effective to detect and stop, through findings of secondary liability, counterfeit
activity that comes from foreign countries and that can be very, very difficult to
detect.
And that brings me now to briefly address the situation in South East Asia. In
particular, I was asked to address the current situation in the member countries of
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is set to formally
launch the ASEAN Economic Community (modeled on the European Economic
Community) in 2015 but which so far remains primarily a free trade area.4 1 Just to
better frame the discussion, ASEAN includes ten countries: Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
Vietnam. Three are common law countries-Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore-
while the others are civil law countries or mixed jurisdictions. What I found very
interesting, while preparing my remarks, is that it does not seem that any of these
countries has (at least explicitly and to date) developed a concept of secondary
trademark liability as we have developed in the United States, in Europe and in
other countries. Instead, in the various ASEAN countries, national trademark laws
directly address only primary liability. Interestingly, in Singapore-the jurisdiction
40. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
41. ASEAN Economic Community, Ass'N SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org/
communities/asean-economic-community (last visited June 1, 2014).
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that I address specifically in the article that is published in this Symposium 42-the
Singapore Trademark Act provides that using a sign "to any material used or
intended to be used for labelling or packaging goods" or "on any document
described in subsection (4)(d) or in advertising" is not considered "use [of] the sign
if, at the time of such application or use, [the defendant] does not know nor has
reason to believe that the proprietor or a licensee of the registered trade mark did
not consent to such application or use of the sign." 43 In other words, under
Singapore trademark law, we have a de facto secondary infringement rule that is
built within the provision on "acts amounting to the infringement of a registered
trademark," which I elaborate upon in my article.
Yet, apart from this provision in Singapore, it does not seem that other ASEAN
countries have any provision on the potential liability of intermediaries with respect
to trademark infringement. Most jurisdictions seem to find guidance in this respect
from the general principles of torts or other civil liability, depending on whether a
legal system is based on common law or civil law.44 We should also not forget that
the majority of ASEAN countries remain less developed than many Western
countries or Singapore. Accordingly, it is important to note that e-commerce is not
as developed in these countries as it may be in the United States or in Europe. In
this respect, the priorities in enforcement may be different in ASEAN jurisdictions
than in the United States and Europe, and we still do not see the same attention to
secondary trademark liability that we see in the United States or in Europe. In most
of these countries, the focus remains on the production and exportation of
counterfeit products in the brick-and-mortar markets-and unfortunately, we are
truly talking about very significant amounts of counterfeit products manufactured
in these countries.
That said, what I found very interesting while preparing my remarks is the
ongoing attempt to export the American models in the provision of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), of which Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and
Singapore are negotiating parties. As a matter of clarification, when I refer to the
"ongoing attempt," I necessarily have to rely-like all TPP commentators-on the
drafts of the TPP that have been "leaked" to the public; the TPP negotiations have
been conducted "secretly," or at least without sharing the proposed texts of the
agreements with academics, consumer associations and so forth. Based on the
42. Irene Calboli, Reading the Tea Leaves in Singapore: Who Will Be Left Holding the Bag for
Secondary Trademark Infringement on the Internet?, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 593 (2014).
43. Singapore Trade Marks Act, 1998, § 27(4). See also Angela Leong & Candice Kwok,
Singapore, in WORLD TRADEMARK REPORT 301, 308 (2005) ("Merely placing a trademark on a website
which may be accessed by Singapore citizens is unlikely to constitute use of a mark in the course of
trade in Singapore. However, if there are advertisements encouraging people in Singapore to access the
website and/or to purchase certain goods or services, this may well constitute use amounting to an
infringement, or use sufficient to defend a registration from revocation for non-use.").
44. See, e.g., Zhize Xia, Intellectual Property-China: Effect of the Tort Liability on IP
Protection, INT'L L. OFFICE (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail
.aspx?G=928a447d-5caO-4836-8elc-8bd8al3d0c71 ("[W]here laws such as the Copyright Law, Patent
Law and Trademark Law contain specific provisions on IP infringement, such provisions prevail.
However, if there are no applicable provisions, the Tort Liability Law becomes operational.").
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provisions of the leaked 2011 drafts of the TPP, it seems that Article 16, which
discusses the special measures that countries would need to adopt with respect to
enforcement in the digital environment (still primarily focusing on copyright
protection), requires that all TPP negotiating countries-including four ASEAN
countries-ensure that enforcement procedures "are available under [their] law
so as to permit effective action against an act of trademark, copyright or related
rights infringement which takes place in the digital environment."45 This includes
"expeditious remedies to prevent infringement and remedies which constitute a
deterrent to further infringement."46 Even though the provision doesn't indicate
specifically how to meet these objectives, the fact that the provision explicitly
requires this type of enforcement is an important change for those countries that, to
date, do not provide ad hoc secondary liability for trademark infringement in the
online environment.
I conclude by noting that in the area of secondary copyright infringement, we
still do not have many cases on point from ASEAN jurisdictions. For example, as I
elaborate in my article, Singapore's courts have developed standards similar to
United States contributory infringement standards in copyright decisions. They
have addressed the concept of "authorizing" infringement under the Singapore
Copyright Act, which (like other Commonwealth countries) still considers
"authorizing" infringement to be primary infringement.47 The principles elaborated
on by the courts in those cases could be usefully imported into future trademark
cases related to secondary liability. Still, we currently do not have specific
provisions establishing secondary trademark liability in national laws of ASEAN
countries, and we have limited or nonexistent national judicial decisions on point.
Then, in some ASEAN countries, we have the possibility that following the
adoption of the TPP (should the ongoing negotiations lead to a final agreement),
American- or Western-model provisions on secondary liability may be
implemented in the national laws of these countries. Ultimately, the current TPP
draft provisions do not indicate what the standards to find secondary trademark
liability should be.48 Based on these observations, the next decade will certainly be
an interesting time for the development of national laws on secondary trademark
liability in ASEAN countries, and we may see interesting judicial developments as
well.
45. See Draft Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 16.1, Feb. 2011, available at
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-Ofeb201 I -us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf. The same provision has
been retained in a later draft, dated August 30, 2013 and leaked on November 13, 2013. Vietnam is
opposing this provision, while Singapore supports it, and Brunei and Malaysia are still considering the
language. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Group Draft Treaty, art. QQ.H.10, Aug.
30, 2013, available at https://wikileaks.orgtpp/static/pdflWikileaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf
46. Draft Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 16.1, Feb. 2011, available at
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2Ol 1-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf.
47. Singapore Copyright Act, 1987, §§ 31(1), 103(1).
48. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, STATEMENT OF THE MINISTERS AND
HEADS OF DELEGATION FOR THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES (Dec. 10, 2013), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/tpp.
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